We study a framework, RLF, for de ning natural deduction presentations of linear and other relevant logics. RLF consists in a language together, in a manner similar to that of LF, with a representation mechanism. The language of RLF, the -calculus, is a system of rst-order linear dependent function types which uses a function to describe the degree of sharing of variables between functions and their arguments. The representation mechanism is judgements-as-types, developed for linear and other relevant logics. The -calculus is a conservative extension of the -calculus and RLF is a conservative extension of LF.
Introduction
Linear and other relevant logics have been studied widely in mathematical 4, 16, 25, 36] , philosophical 3, 14, 33] and computational 1, 20, 24, 32, 37] logic. We present a study of a logical framework, RLF, for de ning natural deduction presentations of such logics. 1 RLF consists in a language together, in a manner similar to that of LF 5, 18, 28] , with a representation mechanism. The language of RLF, the -calculus, is a system of rst-order linear dependent function types which uses a function to describe the degree of sharing of variables between functions and their arguments. The representation mechanism is judgements-as-types, developed for linear and other relevant logics.
We motivate the -calculus by considering an abstract form of relevant natural deduction. We specify the -calculus, a family of rst-order dependent type theories with both linear and intuitionistic function spaces, discussing only brie y the possible intermediate systems. The framework RLF is a conservative extension of LF; the notion of conservative extension takes account of the representation mechanism as well as the type theory. The work reported here builds on ideas presented by Pym in 29] .
An explanation regarding our use of the word \relevant" is in order. Following Read 33] , we use the term relevant for the family of logics which have weaker structural properties than intuitionistic or classical logic, not merely for those which have contraction but not weakening. Read's taxonomy would place linear logic (without exponentials) at the lowest point in the \lattice" (we use the word informally and not in any technical sense) of logics. We follow this taxonomy and thus obtain a lattice of logical frameworks, the weakest being RLF, the type theory of which has neither weakening nor contraction. 2 We emphasize that the -calculus lies properly in the world of relevant logics: the type theory's contexts are a dependently-typed notion of Read's bunches 33] . The title of this paper re ects this point of view. Our framework RLF provides a relevant analysis of natural deduction just as LF provides an intuitionistic analysis of natural deduction. In this paper, we do not study the variety of distributivity laws usually considered for relevant contexts 33] . However, such an investigation should t into our framework, possibly via variations on the -calculus, quite straightforwardly.
The paper is organized as follows. In x 2, we motivate the -calculus in the context of a logical framework by considering an abstract form of relevant natural deduction. We formally de ne it as a type theory and summarize its meta-theory in x 3, concluding the section with a comparison with related work. In x 4 , we show that RLF is a conservative extension of LF. In x 5, we illustrate several example encodings in the RLF framework. The object-logics we consider are a fragment of propositional intuitionistic linear logic, the dynamic semantics of ML with references and a relevant -calculus. Finally, in x 6, we consider the further work that arises from our study.
Motivation
Logical frameworks are formal meta-logics which, inter alia, provide languages for describing logics in a manner that is suitable for mechanical implementation. The LF logical framework 5, 18, 28] provides such a metatheory and is suitable for logics which have at least the structural strength of minimal propositional logic. We wish to study a logical framework for describing relevant logics. Now, in order to describe a logical framework one must:
1. Characterize the class of object-logics to be represented; 2. Give a meta-logic or language, together with its meta-logical status vis-avis the class of object-logics; and 3. Characterize the representation mechanism for object-logics.
The above prescription can conveniently be summarized by the slogan Framework = Language + Representation:
We remark that these components are not entirely independent of each other 30]. We will point out some interdependencies later in this section.
One representation mechanism is that of judgements-as-types, which originates from Martin-L of's 23] development of Kant's 22] notion of judgement. The two higher-order judgements, the hypothetical J`J 0 and the general V x2C : J(x), correspond to ordinary and dependent function spaces, respectively. The methodology of judgements-as-types is that judgements are represented as the type of their proofs. A logical system is represented by a signature which assigns kinds and types to a nite set of constants that represent its syntax, its judgements and its rule schemes. An object-logic's rules and proofs are seen as proofs of hypothetico-general judgements where X is the set of variables that occur in i ; ; J i ; J are judgements; is a proof-object (e.g., a -term); ? X corresponds to X; each x i corresponds to a place-holder for the encoding of J i ; and M is a meta-logic term corresponding to the encoding of .
In the sequel, we do not consider the complete apparatus of judged objectlogics. Our example encodings in x 5 are pathological in the sense that they require only one judgement. For example, the encoding of a fragment of intuitionistic linear logic requires the judgement of (J i = J =) proof. This is in contrast to the general multi-judgement representation techniques 6]. We conjecture that our studies can be applied to the general case, although we defer this development to another occasion. A certain class of uniform representations is identi ed by considering surjective encodings between consequences of the object-logic`L and consequences of the meta-logic` L 19] . 3 So, all judgements in the meta-logic have corresponding judgements in the object-logic. The judgement-as-types methodology has the property that encoded systems inherit the structural properties of the meta-logic. It is for this reason that LF | whose language, the -calculus, admits weakening and contraction | cannot uniformly encode linear and other relevant logics. To illustrate this point, suppose ILL is a uniform encoding of intuitionistic linear logic in LF, and that ?X; ? ` ILL M :J( ) is the image of the object-consequence (X; )`I LL :J( ). If ?X; ? ` ILL M :J( ) is provable, then so is ?X; ? ; ? ` ILL M :J( ). By uniformity, the latter is the image of an object-logic consequence (X; ; )`I LL 0 :J( ), which implies weakening in linear logic, a contradiction.
Thus we seek a language in which weakening and contraction are not forced. We motivate the connectives of the language by considering the natural deduction form of rules for weak logics. We do this in a general way, by considering Prawitz's general form of schematic introductions from a more relevant point of view. Prawitz 27] gives these for intuitionistic logic. A schematic introduction rule for an n-ary sentential operator # is represented by an introduction rule of the form below. In the rule, only the bound assumptions for G j are shown; we elide those for G k , where (k 6 = j), for the sake of readability. The premises G 1 ; : : :; G p are combined either multiplicatively or additively, depending on whether their contexts are disjoint or not. We distinguish between these combinations by the use of two conjunctions; the multiplicative (\ten-sor") and the additive & (\with") and so force the structural rules. (In traditional relevance logics, multiplicative is referred to as intentional and additive as extensional.) We use as meta-syntax for both and &, though mindful of the relationship between the two operators. Full expressivity is recovered by introducing the modality ! (\bang") into our language. The premise !G allows us to depart from relevant inference, and to choose the number of times we use G in the conclusion. In the meta-logic, then, the schematic introduction rule would be represented by a constant of the following type: We can also consider a currying away of the & by a non-dependent version of the additive function space. A language with two kinds of dependent function space is very interesting but is beyond the scope of our current study. We recapitulate exactly how we have used the three logical constants in the framework: the & is used to undertake additive conjunction; the is used to quantify and (in its non-dependent form () to represent implication; and the ! is used to represent dereliction from relevant inference. We should then be able to formulate a precise idea regarding the completeness of the set f&; ; !g with respect to all sentential operators that have explicit schematic introduction rules 27, 35] .
A similar analysis can be undertaken for the corresponding elimination rule. Our analysis allows us two degrees of freedom. The rst is at the structural level of types. In this section, our main intention has been to motivate a language in which the structural rules of weakening and contraction are not forced, and so to be able to uniformly encode linear logic. But this language is only one of a range of relevant logics 33], which includes, for instance, Anderson and Belnaps's relevance logic 3]. Choosing a di erent language, with it's particular structural and distributivity properties, would allow us to uniformly encode another class of logics. The family of relevant logics determined by these choices is very interesting from a representational perspective, though we pursue it no further in this paper.
The second, orthogonal, degree of freedom, and one that we do concentrate on in the sequel, concerns the corresponding range of structural choices at the level of terms (as opposed to types). Considering this aspect from the logical point of view, we consider multiple occurrences of the same proof. The degree to which a proof can be shared by propositions is a structural property which determines, via the Curry-Howard-de Bruijn correspondence, a type theory whose functions and arguments share variables to a corresponding degree.
The language that we have motivated in this section, and develop in the sequel, is a type theory in Curry-Howard-de Bruijn correspondence with a f&; ( ; !; 8; !g-fragment of intuitionistic linear logic (ILL) extended with a 88 linear universal quanti er. The details of the correspondence are deferred to another occasion.
3 The -calculus
The -calculus is a rst-order dependent type theory for a fragment of linear logic with both intuitionistic and linear function types. The calculus is used for deriving typing judgements. There are three entities in the -calculus: objects, types and families of types, and kinds. Objects (denoted by M, N) are classi ed by types. Families of types (denoted by A, B) may be thought of as functions which map objects to types. Kinds (denoted by K) classify families. In particular, there is a kind Type which classi es the types. We will use U, V to denote any of the entities.
We assume given three disjoint, countably in nite sets: the meta-variables x; y; z range over the set of variables; c; d range over the set of object-level constants; and a; b range over the set of type-level constants. The abstract syntax of the -calculus is given by the following grammar: We can de ne the notion of linear occurrence by extending the general idea of occurrence for the -calculus 7], though we note that other de nitions may be possible.
De nition 3.1 (linear occurrence in U) 1 In the sequel we will often refer informally to the concept of a linearity constraint. Essentially this means that all linear variables declared in the context are used: a production-consumption contract. But we depart from the usual resource-conscious logics idea that formulae are produced in the antecedent and consumed in the succedent. Given this, the judgement x:A; y:cx` y:cx in which the linear x is consumed by the (type of) y declared after it and the y itself is consumed in the succedent, is a valid one.
In the -calculus signatures are used to keep track of the types and kinds assigned to constants. Contexts are used to keep track of the types, both linear and exponential, assigned to variables. The abstract syntax for signatures and contexts is given by the following grammar: We write ?` U:V for either of ?` A:K or ?` M:A, and ?` X for ?` K Kind or ?` U:V . We abuse notation and also write ?` X to indicate the derivability of X in the -calculus, in which case the K or U is said to be valid in the signature and context ?.
The de nition of the type theory depends crucially on the following three notions:
1. The joining together of two contexts to form a third must be undertaken so that the order of declarations and type of variables (linear versus intuitionistic) is respected; 2. The idea of linear variable occurrences allows us to form contexts of the form x:A; x:A, for some type constant A in the signature. That is, contexts in which repeated but distinct declarations of the same variable are possible;
3. Following a joining of contexts, certain occurrences of linear variables { those that are shared by a function and its argument { are identi ed with one another. This sharing is implemented by the function. These notions will be explicated at appropriate points in the sequel.
We now present the rules for deriving judgements in Tables 1 and 2 below. To save space, we place any side-conditions along with the premises. The rules are conveniently separated into a linear and an exponential set, the latter relating directly to the intuitionistic -calculus. Table 1: -calculus
The signature formation rules enforce intuitionistic behaviour by allowing only a constant of exponential type to extend the signature. The context formation rules allow only types to be assigned to variables. We distinguish between extending the context by linear ( ; x:A) and exponential ( ; x!A) variables. The context formation rules introduce two particular characteristics of the type theory. The rst one is that of joining the premise contexts for the multiplicative rules. The join must respect the ordering of the premise contexts and the con- The problem is that an excess of linear xs now appear in the combined context after the application step. (In this step, the types match literally. However this problem arises where they are equal too.) Our solution is to recognize the two xs as two distinct occurrences of the same variable, the one occuring in the argument type cx, and to allow a degree of freedom in sharing these occurrences. It is now necessary to formally de ne a binding strategy for multiple occurrences; this we do in x 3.2 below. The sharing aspect is implemented via the function, de ned in x 3.3 below. One implication of this solution is that repeated declarations of the same variable are allowed in contexts. For this reason, the usual side-condition of x = 2 dom( ) is absent from the rules for valid contexts, though of course we don't allow the same variable to inhabit two distinct types. 
Context joining
The method of joining two contexts is a ternary relation ; ?; ], to be read as \the contexts ? and are joined to form the context ". Or, for proof-search: \the context is split into the contexts ? and ".
The rst rule for de ning ; ?; ] states that an empty context can be formed by joining together two empty contexts. The second and third rules comply with the linearity constraint, and imply that the linear variables in are exactly those of ? and . The last rule takes account of the intuitionistic behaviour of exponential variables. In search, the intuitionistic variable x!A would be sent both ways when the context is split. . We remark that if we were also studying the distribution laws for relevant contexts, then the context joining relation would need to take regard of these context equalities. We make a brief remark about the ; ?; ] relation with regard to logic programming. As we noted above, in proof-search (the basis of logic programming) the relation ; ?; ] is read as \split into ? and ". An implementation of the -calculus as a logic programming language would have to calculate such splittings, perhaps using techniques similar to those for Lolli and Lygon 17, 20], although it would be interesting to consider approaches in which ; ?; ] remained unevaluated for as long as possible during search. Such an approach would resemble matrix methods 39].
Multiple occurrences
Consider the multiple occurrences idea from a proposition-as-types reading. Then x:A; x:A can be understood as two uses of the same proof of the same proposition, as opposed to x:A; y:A, which can be seen as distinct proofs of the same proposition. Though this idea can be seen, in the presence of the binding strategy that we are about to de ne, as an internalization of -conversion, it allows us a degree of freedom, that at the structural level of terms (as opposed to types), which is useful in dealing with variable sharing (x 3.3).
In this section, we de ne the \left-most free occurrence of x" in U and a corresponding binding strategy for it. We use this in the sequel, later noting that it can be generalized.
De nition 3.3 The left-most linear occurrence of x in U is de ned as follows, provided that x 2 LFV (U). We use @ to denote atoms (constants and variables) and say \x,@ distinct" if @ is a, c or y. In the sequel we use the left-most binding and cutting strategy as discussed above. We remark that there is a general ij strategy, that of binding the i th variable from the left and cutting the j th variable from the left.
Variable sharing
Variable sharing is a central notion which allows linear dependency to be set up. In fact, this notion is already implicit in our de nition The second clause of the de nition can also be stated as follows: in at least one of ? and there is no y:B(x) to the right of the occurrence of x:A. This clause is needed to form a consistent type theory which allows the formation of su ciently complex dependent types. By this, we mean types such as x 1 :A 1 : : : x n :A n (x 1 ; : : :; x n?1 ) : A in which the abstracting types depend upon previously abstracted variables. In binary rules, it can be that some variables must occur, in order to establish the well-formedness of types in each premise, in the contexts of both premises, and must occur only once in order to establish the well-formedness of types in the conclusion. However, it is possible for other variables occurring in both premises to play a role in the logical structure of the proof; these variables must be duplicated in the conclusion. These requirements are regulated by .
In the absence of sharing of variables, when the rst clause only applies, we still obtain a useful linear dependent type theory, with a linear dependent function space but without the dependency of the abstracting A i s on the previously abstracted variables. For example, we use such a type theory to encode the dynamic semantics of ML with references in x 5 later.
With the de nition of given above, we can consider the following example. The function is not required, i.e., its use is vacuous, when certain restrictions of the -calculus type theory are considered. For instance, if we restrict type-formation to be entirely intuitionistic so that type judgements are of the form !?` A:Type, then we recover the f ; (; &g-fragment of Cervesato and Pfenning's (&> type theory 12]. Our fragment does not include >, the unit of &; we will remark on this while stating the subject reduction property in x 3.5 later. Like the simple dependency case above, this restricted type theory is useful too; we use it to encode a fragment of intuitionistic linear logic in x 5 later.
De nitional equality
The de nitional equality relation that we consider here is the -conversion of terms at all three levels. The de nitional equality relation, , between terms at each respective level is de ned to be the symmetric and transitive closure of the parallel nested reduction relation, !, de ned in Table 4 below. We note that, in the -rules, substitution is performed only for the bound occurrences of x. The transitive closure of ! is denoted by ! . We remark that while -conversion is su cient for our current purposes, we forsee little di culty (other than that for the -calculus 13, 34]) in strengthening the de nitional equality relationship by the -rule.
Basic properties of the -calculus
In this section, we summarize the basic properties of the -calculus, the proofs of which can be obtained by adapting the techniques of 18]. Note that we are concerned here with just the basic, f&; ; !g-fragment, of the type theory.
The choice of the reduction relation ! allows us to prove con uency: Lemma 3.1 (CR Property) If U ! U 0 m and U ! U 00 n , then there exists a V n;m such that U 0 m ! V n;m and U 00 n ! V n;m . Proof The lemma is proven in several steps. First, we show that substitution is conserved under reduction. Then we prove, by induction on the sum of the lengths of the proofs U ! U 0 and U ! U 00 , the diamond property: that if U ! U 0 and U ! U 00 , then there exists a V such that U 0 ! V and U 00 ! V .
CR then follows by an induction on the number of -steps.
The following lemma analyses how a type assignment for an abstraction can be obtained. It is a speci c (part 4) and specialized (for linearity) case of Barendregt's Generation Lemma for Pure Type Systems (PTS) 8].
Lemma 3.2 (Inversion) If ?` x2A :U : x2A :V , then ?; x2A` U:V . Proof Consider a derivation of x2A :U : x2A :V . The conversion rules do not change the term x2A :U. We follow the branch of the derivation until the term x2A :U is introduced for the rst time. This can be done by an abstraction rule. The conclusion of the abstraction rule is ?` x2A :U : x2B :W with x2A :V x2B :W. The statement of the lemma follows by inspection of the abstraction. We remark that, given the next theorem, the above lemma could allow weakening or contraction in the intuitionistic parts of ?.
We recall our earlier comments, in x 2, regarding how the consideration of a particular language allows us to admit certain structural rules. The next theorem details this for the -calculus. We comment on the form of the admissible structural rules. The exchange and contraction rules are inherited from dependent and linear type theory, respectively. The rule for weakening requires that the context for proving the well-typedness of A is entirely intuitionistic. The rule for dereliction requires the derelicting of the free variables in the linear type too. Cut comes in two forms, one for cutting a linear variable and one for cutting an exponential one. The rules are read according to the current binding strategy. The extra side-conditions for exchange enforce the context well-formedness in accordance with the left-most binding strategy. Proof By induction on the structure of the proof of the premises. We omit the details. Proof CR determines, up to de nitional equality, the term x2A :U. UT does the same for the type x2B :V . This is su cient to allow us to infer the result.
Our de nition (3.1) of linear occurrence is motivated by the desire for the type theory to have the subject reduction property. However, it is important that no linear variables are lost during reduction. We stop to consider this problem before proceeding to show the property. Consider the following instance of application: So it follows that a situation as simple as (1), with the loss of an occurrence of a variable from the succedent, cannot arise in the type theory.
The subject reduction property is proved for ! 1 , the one-step reduction relation in the basic type theory. (! and ! 1 de ne the same relation.) Lemma After a -reduction we have ?; z:A` 1:>, and the z is left hanging. However, we conjecture that such an extended type theory will have a weaker form of subject reduction, in which ? 0 ?. The conjecture arises from a consideration of cut-elimination in linear type theory in the presence of 1:>. The point is that -reduction in an example such as the one above e ects not only terms but also proofs and so should therefore properly be considered an inference rule of the type theory.
All reduction sequences in the type theory terminate: The proof idea, again, a variation on an argument in 18], is to de ne a faithful \dependency-and linearity-less" translation of kinds and type families to S, the set of simple types constructed by and ! over a given base type !, and j:j, of type families and objects to (K), the set of untyped -terms of over a set of constants K = f j 2 Sg. Let` denote type assignment following Curry (with products) together with the in nite set of rules for K :! ! ( ! !) ! ! for each 2 .
The translation embeds into such Curry-typable terms of the untyped -calculus in a structure preserving way. The dependency aspect is lost by, for instance, forgetting about the variable x in the term x:A :B. The linear aspect is lost by translating linear and exponential variables in exactly the same manner.
De nition 3. Proof By induction on the structure of the proofs that if A ! A 0 , then (A) = (A 0 ) and that if K ! K 0 then, (K) = (K 0 ). The lemma follows from the fact that is de ned to be the symmetric and transitive closure of !. We omit the details. Lemma 3.7 1. jM N=x]j = jMj jNj=x]. 2. jB N=x]j = jBj jNj=x]. Proof By induction on the structure of M and B respectively. We omit the details.
The next lemma shows the consistency of the translation. which is (M N=x]), by Lemma 3.7. In the second case, Lemma 3.6 su ces for the result.
We can now give the proof of strong normalization. Suppose there was an in nite reduction in the -calculus. Then this would be translated into a reduction in the simply-typed -calculus. As the translation is faithful, the reduction in the simply-typed -calculus would be in nite too. But this cannot be so, as the simply-typed -calculus with pairing is known to be strongly normalizing 15]. So there cannot be an in nite reduction in the -calculus.
Predicativity arises as a corollary of Theorem 3.2. Finally, we have: Proof The argument is the same as for . We observe that, rstly, the complexity of the proof of a judgement is determined by proofs of strictly smaller measure; and, secondly, the form of a judgement completely determines its proof.
The main method underlying this argument involves replacing the conversion rules with a (better behaved) normal-order reduction strategy.
Related systems
In this section, we brie y compare the -calculus to the appropriate fragments of other linear type theories. Abramsky's 1] and Benton's 9] linear type theories are in propositions-as-types correspondence with a propositional ILL. Our concern is with a predicate ILL. Consider a linear version of the Barendregt cube, displayed in so-called standard orientation. Then Abramsky's and Benton's type theories correspond to the ! and 2 nodes; our type theory corresponds to the P node.
Another di erence between Abramsky's and Benton's studies and ours is one of motivation; we study the -calculus as the language of a logical framework. A comparison with Cervesato and Pfenning's work 12] is, perhaps, more appropriate in this case. Their work claims to be inspired by our study's origins 29]. We remark that the description of the LLF framework lacks an account of a notion of representation and that the (&> type theory is a fragment of the -calculus lacking, inter alia, linear dependent function types. To be precise, the f ; (; &g-fragment of (&> can be recovered by restricting type-formation to be intuitionistic, with the consequence that the use of is vacuous. We have noted this restricted type theory in x 3.3.
The key point to make in these comparisons is as follows. It is the construction of the linear dependent function space that necessitates an investigation into various structural properties. These are then explicated by the technical device of multiple occurrences. If our concern were non-dependent ((; !) or intuitionistic dependent ( ) function spaces, then we could do without such analyses.
Conservativity
In this section we show that RLF is a conservative extension of LF. We will need the following translation between the -and -calculi. This is reminiscent of the translation of IL into ILL which maps ! to ! ( 16] Now, our argument must capture the property of conservative extension not only at the level of the type theory but also at the level of a framework. 5 That is, we need to consider, for an arbitrary object-logic L, a translation from its de nition in LF, via an encoding E and signature L , to its de nition in RLF, via an encoding E 0 and signature 0 L , where both E and E 0 are standard judgements-as-types encodings. Proof We de ne E 0 as follows:
where M and M 0 are proof-realizers for the proposition in assumption .
We now have to show that E 0 is a uniform encoding. The proof is by induction on the structure of (2) 
Example encodings
In this section, we illustrate several encodings in RLF. The intention is to bring out the essential characteristics of the -calculus language | the weak structural properties, linear dependent function space and variable sharing | which allow these encodings to be undertaken uniformly via the judgements-as-types mechanism. The object-logic syntax and inference rules are not considered to be consumable resources and are encoded as (intuitionistic) constants in the signature. We adopt the notational convention that the meta-logic be expressed in bold print, so as not to confuse it with the object-logic it encodes.
We state representation theorems for each of the three encodings we undertake. In order to do this, we need a notion of canonical (essentially, long -normal) form. The de nitions and lemmata needed for the characterization of canonical forms in the -calculus are similar to that for the -calculus; we omit them from this presentation. In the following, we will often say that a function is a \compositional bijection"; this simply means that it is a bijection and commutes with substitution.
ILL
Our rst encoding is that of the f ; &g-fragment of propositional intuitionistic linear logic (ILL). We will work through the ILL object-logic in slightly more detail than the others. In this encoding, we work with a restricted type theory in which type formation is entirely intuitionistic; we have discussed such a type theory in x 3.3 previously. Such a restriction picks out the system of Cervesato and Pfenning 12] from amongst the others.
The natural deduction style rules for this logic are given in Table 5 There is one basic judgement, the judgement that the formula has a proof, ILL proof. This is represented by declaring the constant proof!o ( Type in the signature. A proof of a formula is represented by a term of type proof(E( )). The multiplicative operator is used to represent the inference in the object-logic. It is also used { as a curried version of a meta-logical multiplicative conjunction { to combine the representation of the premises of the rules, which are represented by the following declarations in the signature ILL : Valid proofs of ILL are labelled trees with the constraint that assumption packets contain exactly one proposition and all such packets are uniquely labelled 10]. A valid proof of , with respect to a proof context (X; ), 6 is denoted by the assertion (X; )` : , where X is a nite set of variables of rst-order logic, is the list of uniquely labelled assumptions f 1 : 1 ; : : :; n : n g, and FV (dom( )) X. We remark that the treatment of the ILL quanti ers in RLF is essentially the same as that in LF. The rules for proving assertions of the form (X; )` : are given in Table 6 That the decoding functions are total and well-de ned follows from the de nition of canonical forms and the signature. By induction on formulae and proof expressions, respectively, we get D X (E X ( )) = and D (X; ) (E (X; ) ( )) = . Again, by a similar induction, we get that the encoding commutes with substitution.
The encoding can be extended to deal with a f>; ; ; (; 1g-fragment of propositional ILL. The representation of the ILL units forces the design of the type theory. A meta-logical > is required to directly represent the object-logic >; linearity constraints in the type theory mean that an encoding of ?`I LL > would not be a valid -calculus judgement. The case for ? would be similar.
ML with references
Our second encoding is that of the programming language ML extended with references (MLR), a reworking of an example in Cervesato and Pfenning 11, 12] . In our reworking, we exploit the use of the which is not available to Cervesato and Pfenning. Consequently, we are in the full -calculus type theory, in which 's action is non-trivial.
The basic MLR logic judgement is of the form S . K`M LR i ?! a which means: the program i is evaluated with the store S and continuation K and leaves an answer (a store{expression pair) a. The signature MLR begins with the declarations store!Type, cont!Type, instr!Type and ans!Type to represent the syntactic categories of store, continuations, expressions and answers. Evaluation is represented by the following declaration:
We are really only interested in the rule for evaluating re-assignment. This can be stated as follows: where is the MLR unit expression.
The ML memory is modelled by a set of (cell,expression)-pairs. Each such pair is represented by a linear hypothesis of type contains which holds a lvalue (the cell) and its rvalue (the expression). where the assignment instruction c := v is shown in the usual (in x) form for reasons of readability. The rule can also be encoded in such a fashion that the linear property of the memory is formalized via the quanti er. We will illustrate this idea soon. For now, based on our re-working of the MLR example, we can state the following by referring to 12]. One property that it is desirable to show for the MLR logic is type preservation; in the context of a store , if S . K`M LR i ?! a, i is a valid instruction of type , K is a valid continuation of type ! 0 and S is a valid store, then a is a valid answer of type . The main di erence in our reworking of this example is how the proof of type preservation for the EV-REASS rule, prEV-REASS, is encoded. In the above type, prCell and prEv are the proofs of type preservation over cells and for evaluations, respectively. We note that the types of p and p 0 have no linear free variables in them. That is, the type theory we have employed in the encoding does not involve the notion of sharing. Now, the cells could have been quanti ed intuitionistically (as they are in 12]) instead of linearly. In that case, a sub-proof of ?` prEV-REASS:U , where U is the above type of prEV-REASS, would consist of an instance of -introduction. But this would allow us to admit garbage: (cell,expression)-pairs which are occupying memory space but not being used. The linear quanti cation gives us a better representation of memory management. The above encoding realizes the intuition that we are making general statements about linear variables, so the and not the quanti er should be used.
The encoded version of MLR type preservation can be stated and shown as in 12]. We omit the details.
A I -calculus
Our last example is that of the equational theory of a type theory similar to Church's I-calculus, in which abstraction is only allowed if the abstracted variable is free in the body of the function. We use the full expressiveness of the -calculus type theory, with the crucial notion of variable sharing. This allows the quanti er to capture the (traditional) notion of relevance. By contrast, in the encoding of the I-calculus in Avron et al. 5] , the relevance constraint is enforced by introducing extraneous language to axiomatize relevance in domain theory.
The signature I begins with the declaration o!Type to represent the syntactic category of terms. The next three constants represent the object-logic abstraction and application operations, and the equality judgement:
The axioms and rules of the equational theory of the relevant -calculus are encoded as follows: The rst three constant declarations, E 0 to E 2 , encode the re exivity, symmetry and transitivity properties of the object-logic judgement, =. The constant declaration E 3 encodes the object-logic rule of congruence with respect to application. Finally, the constant declaration encodes application. Now, the de nition of means that the x:o quanti es over all occurrences of x in its body. Like the ILL example before, the encoding is illustrating a propositions-as-types correspondence. This allows us to state a stronger representation theorem than that given in Avron et al. 5 ]. : : :, x n :(E(M n ) = E(N n ))` I M :(E(M) = E(N)), where is a proof object of I and M is a canonical object of the -calculus. 6 Further work
In this paper we have studied a framework, RLF, for uniformly encoding natural deduction presentations of weak logics. Further work based on this paper falls into two groups. Firstly, we can continue the proof-theoretic work by exploring the hyper-cube of intuitionistic and linear -cubes, with \diagonal" edges determined by a translation of the form considered in De nition 4.1. We have already mentioned an extension of our current study to include the distributivity laws relating to contexts. We are currently studying the proposition-as-types correspondence and a Gentzenization of the -calculus. Secondly, a study of the semantics of the -calculus would bring together and generalize the Kripke models of linear logic and typed -calculus 2, 26]. We note that many characteristics of functorial Kripke models of the -calculus 31] | -formation as right adjoint to weakening, for instance | are not immediately applicable in our case. We comment that, besides proof-and model-theoretic semantics, it is also important to study the theory of meaning of the type theory 27]; our discussion in x 2 barely touched on this.
